Hearings to examine Department of Defense missile defense activities in review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program.

Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

2025-05-13

Source: Congress.gov

Summary

This meeting focused on the progress and future of missile defense capabilities for the United States, particularly concerning the "Golden Dome" initiative and the defense of Guam, addressing technological advancements, strategic challenges, and budgetary considerations.[ 00:00:11-00:00:23 ]

Themes

Domain Awareness and Golden Dome Architecture

A critical theme was the necessity of enhanced domain awareness for effective missile defense, described as a "seabed to space" approach involving undersea sensors, ground-based radars, air layers like the E-7, and a space layer for tracking hypersonics and detecting launches. General Guillot indicated that Golden Dome would likely leverage existing and in-development systems such as HBTSS, space-based AMTI prototypes, and over-the-horizon radars to achieve full capability within zero to five years. Losing control of specific spectrum portions (lower 3 GHz and 7-8 GHz) would pose an "extraordinarily high level of risk" due to reliance on these ranges for homeland defense systems.

Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)

Lieutenant General Collins provided an update on the HBTSS prototype program, explaining its goal to prove technology for closing the hypersonic kill chain from space. Two systems launched last year have successfully collected data from test bed launches, demonstrating timeliness and sensitivity, with ongoing algorithm updates to improve track quality. The Space Force and Space Development Agency are now incorporating HBTSS-like requirements into their architecture to build an operational hypersonic tracking layer for the future.

Deterrence by Denial & Cost of Missile Defense

Senator King raised concerns about the viability and cost of "deterrence by denial" against advanced threats from Russia and China, noting that current missile defense systems were primarily designed for rogue states like North Korea and Iran. Ms. Yaffe responded that the aim is to create an integrated air and missile defense system that complicates adversary objectives, leveraging new technologies and a mix of capabilities, but acknowledged it would not be an "overnight" solution.[ 00:06:43-00:07:08 ]

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 The $8 billion investment in Guam's defense infrastructure raised questions about the astronomical costs if a similar defense level were applied to numerous U.S. cities, leading to skepticism about financial feasibility compared to other deterrence strategies.

Defense of Guam

Significant progress has been made in establishing an Aegis system on Guam, involving extensive teamwork across services and with the Missile Defense Agency, with early implementation efforts laying groundwork for future military construction. The defense of Guam involves integrating various command and control systems from the Air Force (TACLITE), Navy (Aegis), MDA (C2BMC), and Army (IBCS) through a Joint Integrated Battle Manager to provide a common air picture and decision aids. The Guam National Guard plays a crucial role in providing security for the THAAD battery, with discussions underway to expand their mission set.

SM-3 Missile Program

Senator Kelly questioned the decision to terminate the SM-3 Block 1B production line, especially given its recent successful use in Israel against ballistic missiles.[ 00:24:25 ]

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 Lieutenant General Collins confirmed that the SM-3 program's future is being re-evaluated in light of Golden Dome deliberations and the President's budget, noting that supplemental funding has been crucial for replenishing expended SM3-1B rounds and keeping the production line open for years to come. There was no specific follow-on missile planned to replace the SM-31B, with reliance shifted to the larger, more expensive Block 2A line.[ 00:25:50-00:26:08 ]

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Directed Energy

The potential of directed energy as a cost-effective solution for missile defense (at 75 cents a shot compared to $60 million interceptors) was discussed, with Senator King advocating for increased investment in its research and development. Lieutenant General Collins acknowledged interest but stated that directed energy is still "years away" from being effective against intercontinental ballistic missiles, necessitating continued reliance on layered approaches. Ms. Mace detailed the challenges, noting that weather and atmospheric conditions can significantly affect the lethality and range of lasers, highlighting the need for a mixed-capability approach.

Tone of the Meeting

The tone of the meeting was largely serious, informative, and forward-looking, marked by a clear sense of urgency regarding evolving missile threats.[ 00:00:59 ] There was a mix of confident updates on technological progress and strategic planning, alongside healthy skepticism and critical questioning regarding the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of current and future defense strategies. Speakers emphasized collaboration, continuous improvement, and the complex, long-term nature of missile defense.

Participants

Transcript

ensures that we remain capable of fighting for and from Guam, meeting the challenges of today and tomorrow.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you about this critical mission and the joint commitment to the defense of Guam.  Thank you.
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
Thank you, General Resch, and thank you all for your opening statements.  We don't have too many of us here today, so we may have more than one round of questions.  I'll begin the first round.
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
General Guillaume, I've appreciated our past conversations about the need for increased domain awareness, for we cannot shoot what we cannot see.   As we look towards Golden Dome and the future of missile defense, what additional improvements need to be made with respect to domain awareness?
G
General Gregory Guillot
Madam Chair, I think that what I call the domain awareness layer of Golden Dome is the most critical that we need to have first for the reasons that you just mentioned.  Any chance of using advanced interceptors or defeat capabilities would not be possible if we can't detect and track these threats.
G
General Gregory Guillot
I think that it's a seabed to space approach.  We need to have undersea sensors to detect submarines that can now get closer to North America than they could before based on improved stealthiness of those ships, and then a ground layer that can see much further out because of the advanced
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General Gregory Guillot
STANDOFF WEAPONS THAT OUR ADVERSARIES CAN NOW EMPLOY.
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General Gregory Guillot
WE NEED AN AIR LAYER LIKE THE E-7 TO CLOSE THE KILL CHAIN WITH FIGHTER AIRCRAFT OR SURFACE TO AIR SYSTEMS AND THEN A SPACE LAYER.
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General Gregory Guillot
THE SPACE LAYER WOULD BOTH TRACK AIRBORNE MOVING TARGETS OR AIRCRAFT BUT ALSO SYSTEMS LIKE HBTSS THAT COULD TRACK HYPERSONICS AS WELL AS THE WARNING
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General Gregory Guillot
capability that we need to detect the launches to begin with.
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
Is there anything you can tell us in this setting about Golden Dome and the options that may be available on the sensors and the radar systems that would be used?
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General Gregory Guillot
Madam Chair, I don't know what the Golden Dome will look like, but I suspect that it would be able to use a lot of the systems that are already in place and currently in development, which would give us a full capability in probably something closer to zero to five years as opposed to something a decade out into the future.  A couple of those systems would be the HBTSS that I just mentioned for the hypersonics.
G
General Gregory Guillot
Space-based AMTI, which we have a number of prototype systems on orbit now, over-the-horizon radars, which are also operational, not in the United States, but elsewhere.  And then, for instance, the E7, which many other countries operate.
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
So given that, how much risk would Golden Dome incur if the department was forced to vacate?   the lower 3 gigahertz or portion of the 7 to 8 gigahertz spectrum that it now has?
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General Gregory Guillot
Madam Chair, it's my assessment that we would assume an extraordinarily high level of risk if we lose control of those portions of the spectrum.  Many of the systems that we rely on every day today, much less in the future, for homeland defense reside in that spectrum range.
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
Thank you.   General Collins, can you provide us with an update on the hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor, or the ABTSS system?
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
Yes, Madam Chair, thank you.  So the hypersonic ballistic tracking space sensor is a prototype program that MDA pursued to prove out the technology such that from space we could close the hypersonic fire chain, the kill chain on a hypersonic weapon.   And the focus of that was to prove out that the space system could have the accuracy, the track quality, and get that data into the command and control system fast enough to be able to close that fire control loop.
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
Those two systems launched in February of last year have gone through two test bed launches where we had a test bed target launch, fly a hypersonic profile, and we have collected data from the sensors during that.
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
So far we have proven out the timeliness latency of the fire control loop with those systems as well as the sensitivity of those systems to close the loop.  We're going back with some algorithm updates into the payload to improve on the track quality, but we see that closing as well.  It's been a very successful prototype program.
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
And all along, we've worked in parallel with the Space Force and the Space Development Agency.
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
They now have our HBTSS-like requirements as part of their proliferated warfighting space architecture.  And in the tranches to come in the follow-on years, they will slowly be building up an operational hypersonic tracking layer for us.
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Lieutenant General Heath Collins
Thank you.  Perhaps in another setting, we can talk about a more definitive timeline when that would be available.
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
Thank you.
L
Lieutenant General Heath Collins
Senator King.
Thank you, Madam Chair.  The nature of my questions may appear to be critical.  I'm certainly in favor of defending the homeland against missile attack, no question.  My fundamental question is, is it feasible, given today's technology and also the cost involved?  I'll quote Lincoln, your critic is your best friend.   So take it in that spirit.  For example, Ziafi, you mentioned deterrence by denial.  Is that really viable today, deterrence by denial?  Can we realistically say that we could deny a substantial missile attack from Russia or China or, heaven forbid, both?

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