Hearings to examine the President's proposed budget request for fiscal year 2025 for the Middle East and North Africa.

Near East and South and Central Asian Affairs

2024-06-18

Source: Congress.gov

Participants

Transcript

We are going to convene the subcommittee today to discuss the FY25 budget request for the Middle East and North Africa.  Thank you to our witnesses for being here.  We're going to start with some opening statements from myself and the ranking member, and then we'll get to statements from witnesses and questions.   From the unconscionable terrorist attacks of October 7th, to increasing threats to traffic in the Red Sea, to the spiraling humanitarian disaster inside Gaza, to rising tensions on the Israel-Lebanon border, to the unforeseen transition of power in Iran, the Middle East has been in an unusual amount of tumult and violence since this subcommittee last met to review the State Department's regional budget.  Amidst this chaos,   I have one thought that dominates all others.  Thank goodness at this moment that we have Joe Biden's steady hand on the wheel.  Since October 7th, President Biden and his team, including our witnesses, in particular Secretary Leaf, have been tirelessly working the phones and crisscrossing the region to secure a comprehensive deal that ends the conflict in Gaza and releases the hostages.  And let me underscore how critical it is that this conflict come to a close.   I want Hamas's ability to launch another terrorist attack destroyed.  I want our sacred ally Israel to live without the threat of violence or attack.  And it's important to note that this conflict could end tomorrow if Hamas surrenders, but they won't because they don't give a damn about the Palestinian people.  But I do not understand how Israel's current military strategy in Gaza or their current lack of a strategy for what to do once   the military campaign ends effectuates either of those goals.  Right now, to me, it appears that Israel's Gaza policy is guaranteeing that the threats to Israel continue, not that they are eliminated.  Leveling Gaza to the ground and unnecessarily killing thousands of innocent civilians in the process, it has a short-term moral cost, but it has a long-term strategic cost.
The long-term strategic cost is that the carnage can become a boon to terrorist recruiting.   That's what we saw in the aftermath of our invasions to Iraq and Afghanistan, and I don't understand why we are not learning those lessons.  But just as important as bringing the violence to an end is planning for the day after, because without a plan for how to rebuild and secure Gaza under viable new political leadership, terrorist groups like Hamas are just gonna fill the vacuum, feeding on the despair of the Palestinian people and posing a continued threat to Israel.  It's no secret that right now there is not a viable plan for the day after in Gaza.   I'm glad that the administration is prioritizing planning with regional partners and like-minded allies in the EU and the G7.  I'd like to hear more about that today.  Part of this day-after plan has to include the creation of an independent Palestinian state, not just vague promises of a pathway to a state that never really come to fruition, but a concrete, irreversible timeline that culminates in statehood for the Palestinian people.   Connected to a Palestinian state are recent discussions between Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations.  Normalized relations would be a very good thing.  Reports suggest, though, that the price the Saudis are seeking for such an agreement is a NATO-like security guarantee from the United States, as well as control over the cycle of nuclear enrichment.  That is an extraordinarily high price to command, and I am skeptical that such commitments would ultimately benefit the United States.   We only give those commitments to our most trusted allies.  And over and over again, most recently just last week, when the Saudis refused to sign the Ukraine peace statement, we watch as Saudi Arabia plays us off against our adversaries.  Pulling back to look at the region more broadly, there are other key questions this committee needs to ask today about how we allocate funding.  For instance, does it make sense to habitually renew Egypt's military aid package of $1.3 billion   the exact same amount we have provided every year to Egypt since 1987.