Joint Subcommittee Hearing: V-22 Osprey Update
House Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces
2026-02-10
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Source: Congress.gov
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identified longstanding mechanical reliability issues, particularly in the drivetrain, as well as high maintenance demands, past part shortages, and challenges in sustainment and data use. Both reviews also underscored the importance of discipline risk management and clear communication across the Joint Program Office and the services. We must put these challenges into perspective. Operators still have missions, and these material issues have contributed to low mission-capable rates across the fleet. As the department approaches the end of V-22 production, it is essential that ongoing reliability upgrades and sustainment reforms are fully implemented and sustained. The men and women who fly and maintain this aircraft deserve confidence that safety remains a top priority and we need these aircrafts for operational requirements. We appreciate our witnesses joining us here today and look forward to their testimony as we continue our oversight of this important program. I'd like it to turn it over to ranking member Joe Courtney of the Sea Power Projection Forces next. Kelly and Chairman Bergman who's joined us for organizing today's hearing.
Thank you to Admiral Doherty, General Walsh, and Ms. Madofsky for joining us to discuss this urgent issue that pertains to the safety of our warfighters and the need for a platform that can transport troops and equipment and conduct search and rescue with speed and range. The V-22 program has been a focus of the Armed Services Committee after the catastrophic crash in Japan in November 2023, which occurred on the heels of fatal accidents in June 2022 and August 2023. Under both chairs, we have had briefings in the Armed Services Committee over the past couple of years. and a request was made by HAASC for GAO to conduct a review of the V-22. Today, this hearing follows the issuance of independent reviews by Naval Air System Command and the Government Accountability Office. As I've stated in prior proceedings, I view these reviews in the same light as the reviews that were conducted by Congress and the Navy after the catastrophic collisions in 2017 of the USS Fitzgerald and the USS McCain. Like the V-22 mishaps, Fitzgerald and McCain resulted in an unacceptable loss of life of service members who were performing their jobs in a peacetime environment. As those collisions were indicative of systemic issues with our surface fleet, V-22 is indicative of broader systemic issues with the Navy aircraft readiness. The oversight by Congress with the Navy's collaboration led to systemic improvements. In fact, at the insistence of Senator John McCain, the recommendations of the Navy's comprehensive review were actually codified in the National Defense Authorization Act. That intervention has ensured that seamen are fully qualified before going underway and resulted in an appreciable drop in mishaps. After the CV-22 crash off the coast of Japan in 2023, the services grounded the planes and incorporated various new maintenance and safety protocols, such as a redesigned gearbox and triple-melt steel components to mitigate deadly risk. While those protocols have thus far been successful in preventing loss of life, mechanical issues still plague the program.
As GAO recommended, significant sustainment investments, particularly in repair and spare parts, will be needed to make the V-22s operate safely. Both the subcommittee and I, I am sure, look forward to working with the services and the joint program office as the department lays out its fiscal year 2027 budget request so that there is sufficient investment to follow in on those mechanical changes that we need to implement. But mechanical readiness is only just one element of the V-22's issues. Effective and open communication with the JPO and the services as well as our allies operating aircraft variants is critical to fix this program. One of the key findings of the GAO report was that, quote, the military services have not proactively shared information from hazard and accident reporting with OSPR units across military services. The department concurred with this recommendation. And I was pleased to hear last week from Admiral Doherty and General Walsh about the improved communication and review structure which the Navy and Marine Corps are conducting for this aircraft and encourage the services to continue. Routine meetings are just the start, though, and I hope this hearing is used as an opportunity to lay out as a structured systemic upgrade in communications and information sharing amongst the services that are flying the V-22. I also believe that we should explore the possibility of legislative action to codify elements of these recommendations like Senator McCain pushed for in the aftermath of the 2017 surface collisions. The possibility of legislative action to codify elements of these recommendations like in the aftermath of 2017 would send a powerful message to our service members and the public that real change is happening. If undertaken, I hope that this task is something the department and the committee can work together on to enable the services to operate readily and effectively and protect the lives of our service members. And with that, I yield back.
I thank the gentleman and noted your recommendations, Mr. Courtney. Now I recognize Mr. Bergman, the Chairman of Readiness. Thank you, Chairman Kelly, for recognizing me. I am particularly pleased to be working with you, Ranking Member Courtney, and Ranking Member Garamendi. You might say we've got a few old dogs up on this dais, but we've been around a long time, done a lot, and I look at our newer members here who bring the vitality to the committee, and we're better when we work together. You know, we've got, let's face it, we've got problems with the V-22 program. We have had. Those of us who flew, I've never flown one, but I did fly the simulator when it first came out, and boy, an old 46 pilot had to change some things fairly quickly to understand how to keep it going. But having said that, at the onset, I just want, on a very serious note, to highlight the incredible capability that the V-22 Osprey program provides. The extended range, increased speed, and expanded lift options, when compared to legacy rotary wing capabilities, are essential in maintaining air superiority in the future conflicts. It is not surprising that the Army chose a V-22 Osprey variant as their long-range future assault aircraft. While I remain convinced that the V-22 Osprey program is essential, I find the trends associated with the costs and mission capability rates particularly troubling. The V-22 Osprey faces readiness challenges due to its complex design, high maintenance man-hour requirements, inefficient supply system, and current sustainment strategy. These factors have led to a persistently low mission-capable rate and a 30 percent increase in operating and maintenance costs per flight hour over the past four years.
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