Unmanned and Unchecked: Confronting the Rising Threat of Malicious Drone Use in America

Crime

2025-09-16

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Source: Congress.gov

Summary

This hearing addressed the escalating threat posed by malicious drone use across America, emphasizing the urgent need for enhanced detection, mitigation, and legislative reforms. Participants detailed the myriad ways unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are exploited by criminal elements and adversaries, highlighting critical vulnerabilities in current response capabilities and fragmented legal frameworks. The discussion centered on identifying the scale of the problem, the challenges faced by law enforcement, and potential solutions to safeguard national security, critical infrastructure, and public safety .

Themes

Rising Threat of Malicious Drone Use

The accessibility and affordability of UAS technology have led to a surge in illicit activities, moving beyond science fiction into daily disruptions [ 01:29:52 ]

. Incidents include over 1,000 UAS incursions near U.S. airports in the first half of this year, representing a 13% increase from the previous year [ 01:30:29 ] . Criminal networks exploit drones for contraband drops into prisons, smuggling drugs and weapons across borders, surveilling law enforcement, and even weaponization [ 01:32:16 ] . U.S. Northern Command leadership reported over 1,000 drones crossing the Mexican border monthly, with one region in Texas alone seeing over 10,000 incursions and 25,000 sightings in 2024 . Drones are also a low-cost, low-risk platform for espionage and potential attacks on critical infrastructure . The total number of registered drones in the U.S. has doubled since 2018, now outnumbering manned aircraft by 13 to 1, with projections of further growth .

Challenges in Detection and Mitigation

The current U.S. counter-UAS response is fragmented and inadequate [ 01:31:04 ]

. Remote ID systems, while useful for accountability, do not integrate into real-time air traffic management or provide automatic alerts [ 01:31:17 ] . Most airports and public safety agencies lack dedicated counter-UAS systems [ 01:31:47 ] . Legal restrictions limit who can respond in real time, with only a few federal agencies having broad authority to detect and mitigate drones [ 01:32:03 ] . This leaves state and local law enforcement, who are often first responders to drone incidents, without the necessary legal authority, training, or equipment . Furthermore, distinguishing malicious drone activity from legitimate uses or careless operation presents a significant challenge . There is also a lack of clear indemnification and liability provisions for law enforcement engaging with drones .

Proposed Solutions and Recommendations

Witnesses advocated for comprehensive federal counter-drone legislation to expand legal authorities for detection, tracking, identification, and mitigation to all federal agencies, state and local law enforcement, and trained security professionals . They urged the swift passage of bipartisan bills like HR 5061, the Counter UAS Authority Security Safety and Reauthorization Act, which proposes a pilot program for state and local entities and establishes training standards [ 01:33:48 ]

. Key recommendations include funding and deploying scalable non-kinetic drone detection systems, encouraging public-private collaboration, and educating the public on responsible drone use . The need for robust training programs was emphasized to ensure counter-UAS efforts are safe, legal, and effective, without interfering with the national airspace system . Research and development in counter-UAS technologies also remain vital . The technology exists to safely remove drones from restricted airspaces, such as through cyber takeover to land them .

Supply Chain Concerns

The dominance of Chinese manufacturers, particularly DJI, in the global drone market raises significant national security and espionage concerns . Chinese law compels these companies to cooperate with national intelligence authorities, creating a risk that sensitive data could be transmitted to foreign governments . This vulnerability could be exploited by adversaries to gather intelligence on U.S. critical infrastructure, military bases, and research facilities . The U.S. currently has limited domestic drone production, exacerbating reliance on foreign components . Some jurisdictions, like Florida, have legislated against the use of foreign-made drones by law enforcement to mitigate these risks [ 02:19:21 ]

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Tone of the Meeting

The tone of the meeting was largely urgent and concerned, reflecting the gravity of the accelerating drone threat [ 01:30:25 ]

. Speakers consistently highlighted the critical vulnerabilities in current response capabilities and the inadequacy of existing legal and technological frameworks [ 01:31:04 ] . There was a pervasive sense of frustration regarding bureaucratic hurdles and fragmented authorities that impede effective action . While acknowledging the valuable uses of drones, there were strong calls for decisive and swift legislative action to address the malicious aspects, particularly in preparation for major upcoming events like the World Cup and Olympics . The discussion was collaborative, with expert witnesses providing insights and recommendations to Congress .

Participants

Transcript

I now recognize myself for an opening statement.  I appreciate everyone being here today.  In this hearing we have before us, we're focusing on unmanned aerial systems and how these systems are being exploited by criminal elements.   This issue is no longer confined to science fiction or battlefield environments.  It's now increasingly disrupting daily life in America.  Over the past several years, UAS technology has rapidly advanced, becoming more affordable, more accessible, and more capable.  While this has fueled innovation in commerce, public safety, and emergency response, it has also led to opportunities for abuse by criminals and adversaries alike.  The threats we face today from drones are not theoretical.  They're real, and they demand urgent attention.   Between January and June of this year, the FAA recorded more than 1,000 UAS incursions near U.S.  airports, a nearly 13% increase from the same period last year.  Each of these incidents represents not just a violation of restricted airspace, but a potential catastrophe for passenger safety.  Despite some progress, like remote ID, our response architecture is fragmented.   Remote ID helps with accountability, but it does not yet integrate into real-time air traffic management or provide automatic alerts to airport security.  Additionally, most of our airports lack dedicated counter-UAS systems.  Legal restrictions further complicate matters, limiting who can respond in real time.  The problem does not end with aviation safety.  Criminal networks are adapting UAS technology for nefarious purposes, dropping contraband into prisons, smuggling drugs and weapons across the U.S.-Mexican border,   surveilling law enforcement, and in some cases experimenting with weaponization.  Correctional facilities are continuing to face surging drone drops of drugs, phones, and weapons.  The stealth, speed, and GPS-guided precision of modern drones make it difficult for correctional officers to detect or intercept them without specialized training or technology.  These drops enable organized criminal activity within prison walls, disrupt inmate discipline, and threaten the safety of staff and inmates alike.
U.S.  Northern Command leadership reported that over 1,000 drones cross into U.S.  airspace from the Mexican border each month, with CBP agents noting that in Texas, along the Rio Grande Valley alone, over 10,000 drone incursions and 25,000 drone sightings occurred in 2024.  Unlike conventional smuggling methods, drones offer cartels a cost-effective and low-risk means to deliver small payloads while avoiding direct encounters with U.S.  law enforcement.   CBP and DOD recently recorded 70 incursions in 11 days around Laredo, prompting the deployment of striker units to bolster surveillance.  Equipped with features like night vision and the ability to operate below radar thresholds, these drones present a stealthy and persistent challenge to border security.  Despite this growing threat, CBP lacks the authority to disable or intercept UAS in most circumstances, limiting its ability to respond effectively in real time.   National special security events, NSSEs, such as presidential inaugurations, political conventions, high-profile sporting events, are increasingly vulnerable to drone-based threats due to their symbolic value, dense crowds, and media visibility.  While federal agencies like the U.S.  Secret Service, FBI, and DHS are authorized to deploy counter-UAS capabilities at national special security events, under the Preventing Emergency Threats Act of 2018,   These efforts are intense and confined to a limited number of events each year.  DOJ officials testified that counter UAS protections are typically planned months in advance and require substantial coordination with the FAA to ensure legitimate airspace operations are not inadvertently affected.  As a result, thousands of public events that fall outside the NSSE designation, like any UAS mitigation coverage, even as drone incidents rise nationally.   The expanding use of drones in public spaces also introduces new risks for first responders.