Foreign Influence on Americans' Data Through the CLOUD Act

Crime

2025-06-05

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Source: Congress.gov

Summary

This meeting of the subcommittee focused on the implications of the CLOUD Act and concerns regarding foreign influence over Americans' data, particularly highlighting recent actions by the United Kingdom.[ 00:18:38 ]

[ 00:19:08 ] Speakers expressed a shared concern for protecting privacy and security in the digital age, emphasizing the need for robust safeguards against unauthorized data access.[ 00:23:49 ]

Themes

The CLOUD Act and its Purpose

The Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act), passed in 2018, was designed to enable U.S. law enforcement to obtain data held by U.S.-based service providers but stored overseas, and to allow allied countries to enter bilateral agreements for similar data access.[ 00:20:09-00:20:37 ]

While acknowledged as providing a framework for advancing U.S. interests and public safety, concerns were raised about its current effectiveness in protecting American data.

UK's Technical Capability Notice and its Implications

A primary point of discussion was the Washington Post's report that the UK secretly ordered Apple to build a backdoor into its devices, threatening the security of encrypted data.[ 00:20:45-00:20:45 ]

This technical capability notice (TCN) regime under the UK's Investigatory Powers Act allows the UK to compel companies to modify systems to access data, and these orders are secret, ill-defined, and extraterritorial, affecting users worldwide.[ 00:21:11 ] Both Apple and Privacy International are challenging this order.

The Dangers of Backdoors and Weakening Encryption

Witnesses universally condemned backdoors, explaining that they create inherent security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by bad actors, including hostile states and cybercriminals, not just legitimate law enforcement.[ 00:21:58-00:22:33 ]

End-to-end encryption was highlighted as a critical tool for maintaining the privacy and security of digital information, crucial for individuals, businesses, and national security.[ 00:21:27 ] The Salt Typhoon hack, where Chinese hackers accessed U.S. wiretap systems, was cited as a clear example of the dangers of surveillance backdoors.[ 00:22:15-00:22:23 ] [ 00:33:37 ] Leading national security experts and government guidance recommend the widespread use of strong encryption.[ 00:23:37-00:23:45 ]

Need for CLOUD Act Reform

Multiple calls were made for reforms to the CLOUD Act and related agreements. Suggestions included the Department of Justice (DOJ) acting decisively, potentially by invoking the 30-day termination clause of the U.S.-UK agreement if the UK does not withdraw its order to Apple.[ 00:22:59-00:23:19 ]

[ 01:21:59-01:22:05 ] Proposed amendments to the CLOUD Act included requiring countries to demonstrate respect for cybersecurity, explicitly prohibiting anti-security obligations for American companies, and ensuring greater transparency and congressional oversight of these agreements.[ 01:24:15-01:24:20 ]

Broader Surveillance Concerns

The discussion extended to broader concerns about government surveillance, including the potential for incidental collection of Americans' data by foreign governments through CLOUD Act agreements.[ 01:10:04-01:10:17 ]

The need for judicial authorization and post-surveillance notice for citizens was emphasized. Concerns were also raised about the U.S. government's access to the FISA Section 702 database on Americans without a warrant and a separate issue regarding a national citizen database using Palantir.

Tone of the Meeting

The tone of the meeting was largely serious and concerned, reflecting a strong bipartisan consensus on the importance of privacy and security in the digital age.[ 00:19:08-00:19:13 ]

Speakers expressed disappointment in the UK's actions and presented an urgent call for decisive action and legislative reform to protect American interests and civil liberties.[ 00:22:59-00:23:19 ] [ 01:21:59-01:22:05 ] [ 01:22:35-01:22:59 ]

Participants

Transcript

Subcommittee will come to order.  Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare recess at any time.  We welcome everyone to today's hearing on the Cloud Act and foreign influence on Americans' data.  I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Nels, to lead us in the Pledge of Allegiance.   Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. Nils.  I now recognize myself for an opening statement.  I welcome my colleagues to this important hearing and welcome our audience and our witnesses today.  I thank each of our witnesses for being here today with special recognition for one of our witnesses who flew all the way from the UK to testify today.  Thank you.   Given advances in technology and the heightened interconnectivity of the digital era, personal data, business information, and sensitive communications are sent, received, and stored all over the world.  Often during an investigation, law enforcement needs to acquire this information from U.S.  companies.  Until 2018, if this information was held in another country, for example, a data server in Ireland, it wasn't clear whether U.S.  law enforcement would be able to obtain it, even though it was requesting the data from a U.S.  company.   In 2018, Congress passed the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, or the CLOUD Act, to address this gap in the law.  Under the CLOUD Act, U.S.  law enforcement, pursuant to a lawful court order, can obtain data held by U.S.-based service providers but stored outside of the United States.   The Cloud Act also provides avenues for our allies to enter into bilateral agreements with the United States to similarly obtain their citizens' data from these same service providers to assist with their own law enforcement investigations.
Unfortunately, one of our closest allies, the United Kingdom, is taking advantage of its authorities under the Cloud Act and is attacking America's data security and privacy.   In February of this year, the Washington Post reported that the UK had secretly ordered Apple to build a backdoor into its devices to enable UK law enforcement to access a user's data stored on the cloud, including encrypted data.  The Cloud Act requires that a country entering into a data access agreement with the United States have laws that include robust protections for privacy and civil liberties.  The UK's order, however, threatens the privacy and security rights not only of those living in the UK,   but of Apple users all over the world, including Americans.  This order sets a dangerous precedent and, if not stopped now, could lead to future orders by other countries.  The UK's Investigatory Powers Act permits it to issue orders to tech companies, compelling them to weaken encryption or halt security updates for users around the world.  This broad extraterritorial order highlights the tension between national security and individual rights.   These interests are not mutually exclusive, and it is possible to protect both national security and individual rights.  Providing law enforcement with the tools to conduct investigations is a laudable, important goal, but the UK is seemingly emboldened by its agreement with the United States under the Cloud Act as issued an order that will affect people all over the world, and this is a step too far.  Encryption is a critical tool to maintain the privacy and security of digital information and communications.   Efforts to weaken or even break encryption makes us all less secure.  The U.S.-U.K.  relationship must be built on trust.  If the U.K.  is attempting to undermine this foundation of U.S.  cybersecurity, it is breaching that trust.  If companies are forced to build backdoors to encryption that simultaneously opens a backdoor to privacy rights or an invasion of privacy rights, it is impossible to limit a backdoor to just the good guys.