CITI Hearing: Fiscal Year 2026 Review of the Department of Defense’s Cyber Posture (May 2025)

House Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies, and Innovation Subcommittee

2025-05-16

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Source: Congress.gov

Summary

This meeting of the Department of Defense Cyber Warfare Enterprise featured testimony from Ms. Laurie Buckhout and Lieutenant General William Hartman, focusing on the current state of cyber defense, ongoing threats, and the challenges of managing the cyber workforce and operational strategies.[ 00:21:51-00:21:53 ]

[ 00:33:29-00:33:42 ]

Themes

Leadership and Organizational Challenges

Concerns were raised regarding the recent unexplained dismissal of General Joe Hawk, the former head of US Cyber Command and NSA, which was described as not serving national security interests and drawing bipartisan opposition from Congress.[ 00:22:50 ]

There is also strong congressional opposition to any potential separation of the dual-hat relationship between Cyber Command and the NSA, a construct seen as vital for national security.[ 00:23:18 ] Discussions also touched on the revamp of the Cyber Comm 2.0 effort, with a preference for a SOCOM-like model for organizational structure, aimed at improving efficiency in force presentation and training.[ 00:34:39 ]

Cyber Threat Landscape

The United States is considered to be "at war" in the cyber domain, facing deliberate attacks from nation-states like the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, as well as Iran and North Korea.[ 00:22:15 ]

These attacks, exemplified by Volt and Salt Typhoon, target critical infrastructure such as transportation, energy, and telecommunications.[ 00:22:18 ] Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) also pose a significant threat through ransomware attacks.

Workforce, Readiness, and Talent Management

Achieving and sustaining a high level of readiness across the cyber warfare enterprise is a key priority, especially given that foundational readiness standards were only recently met after more than a decade. Talent management, including recruitment, retention, and development of highly skilled individuals, remains the top priority for Cyber Command, with an emphasis on building "mastery" in the force. The impact of a hiring freeze is a concern, potentially affecting the ability to fill critical roles and bring in necessary talent.[ 00:42:09 ]

Additionally, there is a recognized need to improve mental health support for cyber operators, who often experience deployment-like conditions stateside.[ 01:13:59 ] [ 01:14:31 ]

Operational Strategy and Rules of Engagement

There is an ongoing re-evaluation of rules of engagement to better counter adversaries in cyberspace, acknowledging the rapid pace of technological change and adversary actions.[ 00:34:59 ]

[ 00:36:04 ] The Department of Defense is working to ensure cyber capabilities are well-integrated to support other combatant commanders and national defense, with a new 2025 cyber strategy in development.

Disinformation and Influence Operations

While disinformation is recognized as a significant threat and a "major line of attack," especially through platforms like TikTok, Twitter, and Facebook, countering it is not explicitly within the current mission set of Cyber Command or the policy office. The focus for Cyber Command remains on foreign adversaries linked to foreign governments who attempt to execute operations targeting the United States.[ 01:10:46 ]

Tone of the Meeting

The tone of the meeting was primarily serious and concerned, reflecting the critical nature of cyber warfare and the ongoing threats.[ 00:22:29 ]

There was a strong bipartisan consensus on the gravity of the cyber threats and the importance of a robust cyber defense. However, there was also clear frustration and criticism directed at the administration regarding leadership decisions, particularly the unexplained dismissal of General Hawk, and the impact of the hiring freeze on vital cyber personnel.[ 00:22:39 ] [ 00:58:43 ] Witnesses maintained professionalism, often deferring specific operational details to a closed session when publicly discussing sensitive matters.

Participants

Transcript

M
Ms. Laurie Buckhout
It's about time we get this show going.   Hey, thank you for, first of all, thanks to the members that are with us.  We had a change in schedule yesterday, so I appreciate those who stayed here to do this very important hearing.  I want to say right up front, I respect both of our folks who are testifying today.  I appreciate you both being here.  I've gotten to know you both.  I've known Ms.  Bookout from when she was a colonel, and I've enjoyed getting to meet the general and appreciate the job you guys are doing.   So good morning to everybody that's here, and welcome to today's hearing on the Department of Defense's Cyber Warfare Enterprise.  Since taking the gavel, many of you have heard me refer to this panel simply as the Cyber Subcommittee, because people know what that is.  They're not too sure what a CITI is, but we know what a Cyber Committee is.  This is not the reflection of our other core responsibilities, but rather that our oversight of the military's cyber warfare posture is the most operational mission under the subcommittee's jurisdiction.   We're at war in the cyber domain, and just the last two years the United States has been directly and deliberately attacked by the People's Republic of China and other nation states in the cyber domain.  Volt typhoon, salt typhoon, flax typhoon, and countless other cyber attacks have taken aim at U.S.  transportation, energy, water, telecommunications, and other critical infrastructure.   It is time to stop talking about preparing for conflict because we are already in one.  I, for one, believe that it is now time that we start acting like it.  However, recent actions by this administration raised some concerns for me and others on this committee, subcommittee, where they truly believe it.   First is the issue of leadership.  A few weeks ago, the cyber commander of US Cyber Command and director of the NSA, the two most important cyber organizations in the United States government, was relieved from command without any explanation.  Joe Hawk was the most cyber experienced officer to ever hold this position.  He was highly respected by his people and his peers and feared by our enemies.   Removing it from the cyber battlefield in this way served absolutely no national security interest.  All this did was help Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea to do what they could not do for themselves.
And I don't ask our two folks today to talk about this.  This is not on you.  But when the Secretary of Defense comes to the Armed Forces Committee, he will have to answer for this.  Secondly, it's renewed speculation about the separation of the dual relationship between Cyber Command and NSA.   a construct that proves its value to our national security every minute of every day.  This issue has been studied exhaustively, but somehow there are still those who believe they know better.  I spoke to my colleagues on this panel and our friends in the Senate, and on a bipartisan and bicameral basis, the Armed Services Committees, plural,   are strongly opposed to ending this dual hat relationship.  I want to take this opportunity to make very clear to the department's leadership that if they believe that they have allies on this issue who sit on the Pentagon's congressional oversight panels, they do not.  Third, I remain concerned about the state of our cyber training and readiness.  Joe Hartman's statement noted that the service cyber components only recently attained foundational readiness standards.  Foundational readiness has a very specific meaning, and the fact that it took us more than a dozen years to reach this point   is not something to celebrate, though I'm glad we're here now.  To succeed in the cyber domain, we need more, far more than foundational readiness, and I'm particularly interested in hearing from both of you what you need to create and sustain a high level of readiness across the cyber warfare enterprise.  I believe a good starting point is to ensure the cyber readiness metrics reported to Congress are meaningful, accurate, and honest.   As we discussed with your teams at the last Cyber Quarterly Brief, we don't request these numbers to hear good news, but to understand the ground truth and focus on our finite time and efforts and what we need to improve.  I say all this because our adversaries are clearly not deterred from acting against us, and we're clearly not meeting our potential in developing the cyber capability capacity and posture that is commensurate with the threat.  Over my last eight years on this committee, I've often heard how we are getting better.   That may be true, but it's been 15 years, and we should be there by now.  I ask both of you here today to help us chart a course to get us there quickly.  With that, I want to introduce our witnesses, Ms.