Oversight Hearing – The United States Navy and Marine Corps
2025-05-14
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Source: Congress.gov
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Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to order. Today the subcommittee will receive testimony from the Honorable John Phelan, Secretary of the Navy, Admiral James Kilby, Acting Chief of Naval Operations, and General Eric Smith, the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. Mr. Secretary, congratulations on your appointment. We've already had several productive engagements, and I look forward to continuing to work with you. Admiral Kelby, General Smith, thank you for joining us today. We greatly appreciate your service. Today we meet at a time of increasing global instability. The Navy and Marine Corps are under extraordinary operational demand, responding to threats across every domain. For the past 19 months, naval forces have engaged daily combat operations in the Red Sea to protect international shipping from Iranian-backed Houthi attacks. These actions underscore the critical role our fleet plays in maintaining freedom of navigation and the security of global commerce. At the same time, we face a rising near-peer challenge in the Indo-Pacific. China continues to build the world's largest navy, surpassing the U.S. Navy in both ship count and shipbuilding capability. China is on pace to surpass the United States Navy in firepower in the coming years. Already today, the Chinese far outnumber us in hypersonic weapons. In any potential conflict with China, the Navy will be the linchpin of our ability to protect and project power across the vast Indo-Pacific region. The sheer scale of that theater demands a capable and ready fleet, and I remain deeply concerned that we are not building or sustaining our naval forces at the pace required to meet that challenge. Years of delay, cost overruns, workforce challenges have slowed production across critical shipbuilding programs. including the Virginia and Columbia class submarines, Ford class aircraft carriers, and the Constellation class frigates.
At the same time, the demand for capable, survivable platforms is only increasing. Delays in construction of the lead Columbia-class submarine presents a significant risk to strategic deterrence. I understand that the delivery schedule continues to slip since the 45-day shipbuilding review that was completed last spring, and the Columbia program is now looking at an 18- to 24-month delay in delivering the lead ship. How does this happen to the Navy's priority program? Further, I fear the delays in the Virginia-class program will only be compounded by delays in Columbia-class submarine construction. The Virginia-class program continues to hoover at the construction cadence of 1.2 submarines a year versus the necessary cadence of two per year. Congress has invested significantly in the submarine industrial base. I want to know when these investments will prove out. While my optimism is waning, I'm hopeful that the recent award of funding for wage and productivity enhancements at the prime shipyards will help turn the tide. Ship maintenance and repair is another significant problem. Too many ships are stuck in yards too long, impacting readiness and deployment schedules. The Navy continues to face serious challenges in sustaining fleet readiness due to persistent maintenance delays across both public and private shipyards. A shortage of skilled labor, aging infrastructure, and inconsistent planning are undermining our ability to execute timely and maintenance availability. The problem carries operational consequences that are immediate and strategic. Delays ripple through deployment schedules, degrade crew morale, strain already over-tasked platforms. These readiness shortfalls directly impact the Navy and the Marine Corps' ability to respond to global crisis and surge forces where needed. Without decisive improvements in maintenance execution, we risk building a fleet on paper that cannot meet operational demands in practice.
This brings me to the Navy's requirement around amphibious warfare ships. While the Navy is required to maintain a fleet of at least 31 amphibs, the current state of the fleet raises serious doubts about whether that requirement is being met in an operationally credible way. Aging hulls, maintenance delays, and lack of sustained investment have eroded the operational availability of our amphibious fleet, putting real pressure on the Marine Corps' ability to train, deploy, and respond globally. Amphibious ships are not operational assets. They are central to our ability to project power, reassure our allies, and deter adversaries. The committee expects a plan not just to meet the letter of the law, but to ensure that the amphibious fleet is truly capable and ready. We must get shipbuilding back on track, strengthen the industrial base that supports it. That includes looking to expand international cooperation, particularly with close partners like Japan, South Korea, who are developing advanced naval technologies, regional shipbuilding expertise that may present a collaborative opportunity. We need to create solutions to increase output, throughput, expand capacity, and leverage private sector partnerships where possible. Now, I've questioned the Navy's future investment in aircraft carriers, and I think we've seen a valuable discussion as a result. We shouldn't be afraid to have these debates, but I want to be clear today The aircraft carrier serves a critical role in power projection and will most certainly continue to provide the joint force with extraordinary strike warfare and unrivaled air superiority as we enter the Davidson window and beyond. That said, we cannot effectively operate carriers without aircraft. I'm alarmed by the downward trend in Navy's procurement in strike fighter aircraft over the last several years.
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