Oversight Hearing – The United States Air Force and Space Force
2025-05-06
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Source: Congress.gov
Participants
Transcript
Good afternoon. Defense Subcommittee will come to order. The topic of today's hearing is oversight of the Department of the Air Force. We have three witnesses before us today, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Gary Ashworth. Gary, we all like you, but hopefully your replacement will be confirmed here shortly. General David Alvin, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and General Chance Saltzman, Chief of Staff of Space Operations. Secretary Ashworth, welcome to the subcommittee. General Alvin, General Saltzman, welcome back. Obviously, we all know the administration released the skinny budget. The chairman here said it took him a whole 15 seconds to read it, so it was pretty skinny. So for the fiscal year 2026, last Friday, This request includes more than $1 trillion overall for the national defense. However, it does so by assuming $113 billion in funds through reconciliation. The reconciliation process is not a sustainable approach to resourcing defense. It's not a substitute for regular appropriations. We are awaiting full details behind the Pentagon's request, but I'm glad the administration has prioritized significant funding for defense, especially to modernize the nation's nuclear deterrent and to support American space superiority. While we will be limited in discussing specifics of the FY26 budget, I would like to hear about your priorities for next year. I'd like to hear about your approach to leading the Air Force and Space Force in an increasingly dynamic and complex world. From my perspective, you've got your work cut out for you, absolutely. The Air Force has had its share of challenges, including the Sentinel Nunn-McCurdy breach, a number of cost overruns, and schedule delays that have resulted in less Air Force, not more. I was pleased, however, the Air Force will be moving forward with the F-47.
the next generation air dominance platform, which was unfortunately delayed at the direction of the former Secretary. This craft, I think, will be critical in the future of air superiority. Given the priority of this program, I expect that it will be appropriately resourced in the President's budget submission. The program also needs to be rigorously managed to ensure that it remains on time and on budget. We can't have another repeat of the F-35 program. I've said it before, but quantity has a quality onto itself. The Air Force has been challenged in both procuring the air platforms it needs and adequately sustaining the air platforms it has. Turning to space, Space Force continues to have an acquisition challenge as well, such as the GPS OCX program, which is more than seven years late. I'd like to get an update on Space Force's progress in building more resilient space systems. Our adversaries are rapidly expanding and enhancing their space capability to challenge the United States. I'd also like to understand more about the plans for the Golden Dome Missile Defense Shield. This committee needs to have a clear understanding of the Golden Dome concept. Specifically, what is the Golden Dome? Is it technically feasible? How much will it cost? And who is in charge? Overall, I remain very concerned that the Department of Defense continues to struggle with delivering critical capability on time and on budget. To be blunt, I think the defense acquisition system is broken and urgent action is needed to address these programs. So I'm pleased to see that the President signed an executive order earlier this month directing the Secretary of Defense to review the antiquated defense acquisition process, address burdensome regulations, make recommendations to incentivize the acquisition workforce, to utilize innovative acquisition authorities, and take measured and calculated risk.
I would like to note that nearly 50 years ago, Hyman Rickover, father of the nuclear navy, testified before the subcommittee about the core problems in managing complex development programs. It was right here in this very room. Rickover observed that the military rotation system where the program managers are replaced every two or three years was a major cause of problems. Rickover testified that due to the short of duration in the job, program managers, quote, have only the shallowest knowledge of the theory of the techniques they must deal with and little experience with the practical problems involved. And they are never kept long enough on the job to acquire such skill and knowledge. Before the results are in, the manager will have moved on and a new manager, equally unqualified technically, will take his place. Rickover continued, naturally the new manager will feel no responsibility for prior decisions and actions. His primary ambition will be to keep the program moving in the hope that it will not fail during his own tour. Thus, responsibility cannot be fixed and there is no bound to the little continuity and technical direction for most of the defense developments underway today.
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